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This commentary is a critical appraisal of Gil-Pérez et al.’s (2002) conceptualiza-
tion of constructivism. It is argued that the following aspects of their presentation 
are problematic: (a) Although the role of controversy is recognized, the authors im-
plicitly subscribe to a Kuhnian perspective of ‘normal’ science; (b) Authors fail to 
recognize the importance of von Glasersfeld’s contribution to the understanding of 
constructivism in science education; (c) The fact that it is not possible to implement 
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a constructivist pedagogy without a constructivist epistemology has been ignored; 
and (d) Failure to recognize that the metaphor of the ‘student as a developing sci-
entist’ facilitates teaching strategies as students are confronted with alternative/
rival/conflicting ideas. Finally, we have shown that constructivism in science edu-
cation is going through a process of continual critical appraisals.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This commentary is primarily a response to Gil-Pérez et al.’s (2002) 
presentation of constructivism, which in our opinion has various ques-
tionable aspects. In this section we briefly summarize the develop-
ment and evolution of constructivism in science education in the last 
three decades, and then in subsequent sections we present a critique 
of Gil-Pérez et al.’s conceptualization of constructivism.  
Most science educators would perhaps agree that during the seven-
ties and the eighties among other forms of constructivism, Ausubelian 
and Piagetian constructivism played a dominant role. The research lit-
erature maintained an intense debate between these constructivist po-
sitions (cf. Novak 1977). Ausubelian constructivism promoted mean-
ingful receptive learning and ‘concept maps’ (Novak 1979), whereas 
Piagetian constructivism promoted the ‘learning cycle’ generally as-
sociated with discovery learning [Science Curriculum Improvement 
Study, SCIS (Karplus et al. 1977)]. Both parties were aware that con-
structivism was a controversial topic and only debate could elucidate 
its different aspects. Interestingly, the 1980 AETS Yearbook: The Psy-
chology of Teaching for Thinking and Creativity (Edited by Anton E. 
Lawson) bears witness to the willingness of the protagonists to en-
gage in critical appraisals (The Yearbook has chapters among others 
by Ausubel, Case, Karplus, Lawson, and Novak). The Foreword to the 
Yearbook was written by Piaget, who after recognizing that “This Year-
book provides a rich diversity of opinion regarding the development 
of intelligence and creativity”, concluded: “It simply is not enough for 
the student to listen to lessons in the same manner as an adult listens 
to a lecture for reasoning to be created in the child and adolescent” 
(Piaget 1979, p. i). Given our present understanding of constructivism, 
many science educators may consider this statement to be rather ‘triv-
ial’ (cf. Tsaparlis 2001), and even common ground between those who 
support constructivism and those who oppose it for other reasons.  
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Detailed and perceptive critiques were soon to follow and the one 
by Hodson (1985), although primarily a critique of the Nuffield curric-
ulum, is quite representative: “To a large extent it is teachers’ inade-
quate understanding in philosophy of science, particularly the contin-
ued advocacy of inductivism (long since abandoned by philosophers of 
science), that leads them to project an unfavourable image of science 
and the activities of scientists through the hidden science curriculum. 
Such a view of scientific method undervalues creativity and treats dis-
covery as testing and proof” (pp. 27–28). Similarly, Millar and Driver 
(1987) critiqued Piagetian constructivism by suggesting that science 
teachers need to go beyond processes by emphasizing content.  
Looking ahead, 1990 was perhaps a landmark year for the science 
education community. Ernst von Glasersfeld, was the invited plenary 
speaker at the 63 Annual Conference of the National Association for Re-
search in Science Teaching (NARST), Atlanta, GA. The session was pre-
sided by Ken Tobin and among others Anton Lawson was on the panel. 
Interestingly, however, at the same Conference there was a Sympo-
sium entitled: “Role of the Epistemic Subject in Piaget’s Genetic Epis-
temology and its Importance for Science Education”, with the follow-
ing participants: Richard Kitchener, Anton Lawson, Joseph Novak and 
Mansoor Niaz. The presence of Ernst von Glasersfeld could be inter-
preted by some as the dawn of a new ‘paradigm’ (preferably research 
program) while yet the old paradigm (Piagetian constructivism) con-
tinued to debate important issues. It is interesting to note that Kitch-
ener (1987), an important scholar in Piagetian genetic epistemology, 
was also making his debut at NARST. During the Symposium, von Gla-
sersfeld was in the audience and interpreted the importance of Piag-
et’s epistemic subject within his constructivist framework: “. . . there is 
also the subject that does the actual constructing of an epistemic sub-
ject qua abstraction, and this is always a psychological subject with all 
its ties to the social and historical context in which it operates” (von 
Glasersfeld 1990). Details of the presentation of other participants in 
the Symposium are available in the literature (Kitchener 1993; Law-
son 1991; Niaz 1991). Von Glasersfeld’s plenary lecture aroused consid-
erable interest, to the extent that he was invited as a plenary speaker 
again at the 66th Annual Conference of NARST, Atlanta, GA, 1993. To 
our knowledge, in the last twenty years only one other plenary speaker 
(John Bransford) has been invited twice by NARST.  
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Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism has been the subject 
of intense critical scrutiny in the science education community. Ken 
Tobin, a major proponent of his ideas, now seems to be skeptical of 
constructivism in general (including radical) and wants to ‘move on’ 
towards other alternatives (Tobin, 2000). Osborne (1996) is particu-
larly critical of radical constructivism’s conflation of validity and via-
bility. In other words, for radical and some social constructivists, expe-
rience is the ultimate arbiter for deciding between scientific theories 
and how students acquire knowledge. Kelly (1997) and Niaz (2001a) 
have asked: Should we teach both creationism and evolutionary the-
ory, given that many students and teachers find creationism viable 
with their experience? This inevitably leads to the following dilemma: 
“The radical constructivists seem to have smuggled in positivistic the-
ory choice criteria under the rubric of viability” (Kelly 1997, p. 366). 
Nola (1997) has emphasized that von Glasersfeld and other construc-
tivists ignore the fact that their conceptualization of the growth of 
knowledge has to compete, and often unfavorably, with rival views. 
Hardy and Taylor (1997), on the other hand, want to blend radical con-
structivism with Habermas’ theory of communicative action.  
In the case of Jenkins (2000), who asked: ‘Constructivism in school 
science education: Powerful model or the most dangerous intellec-
tual tendency?’, Gil- Pérez et al. (2002) almost foresee conspiratorial 
overtones. Our reading, however, shows that this was not the inten-
tion. Jenkins (2000) has argued that early research on ’misconcep-
tions’ dealt with concepts such as force, energy, gravity and mass (all 
related to everyday experiences of the students) and hence the popu-
larity of constructivism in teaching such concepts. On the other hand, 
it is extremely difficult to elicit students’ ideas about concepts such 
as an ion, electromagnetic radiation, oxidation, free energy, chemi-
cal equilibrium, and a host of other concepts. Finally, Jenkins has cau-
tioned with respect to the limitations of constructivism (i.e., it is not 
a powerful model) and nor does it constitute the ‘most dangerous in-
tellectual tendency’ (p. 607).  
An important aspect of most constructivist notions is ‘participant 
observation’, viz., in order to understand students’ construction of sci-
entific concepts, the researcher must observe them as closely as pos-
sible and preferably without prior theoretical frameworks (cf. Erick-
son 1986, Guba & Lincoln 1989). Philosophers of science have drawn 
attention to the problematic nature of observations and that most 
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observations are theory laden (Kuhn 1962, Lakatos 1970). This leads 
us to a paradox. Early critiques of Piagetian constructivism (cf. Hod-
son 1985) were based precisely on its underlying empiricist philoso-
phy (discovery learning). Matthews (1993) was perhaps the first critic 
to have argued that even radical and social constructivism are basi-
cally empiricist in orientation: “Any epistemology that formulates the 
problem of knowledge in terms of a subject looking at an object and 
asking how well what is seen reflects the nature or essence of the ob-
ject [participant observation] is quintessentially Aristotelian or, more 
generally, empiricist” (p. 364). For a recent appraisal of the empiri-
cist stance of constructivism and its relation to Berkeley’s idealism, 
see Nola (in press).  
In these brief introductory remarks, we have tried to show the con-
troversial nature of the growth of knowledge and the various forms of 
constructivism. In the last three decades we have seen how Ausube-
lian/Piagetian constructivisms had to compete not only among them-
selves but also with radical, social and other forms of constructivism 
(Geelan 1997, Marín & Benarroch 1994, Phillips 1995). Some schol-
ars would even argue that Piagetian constructivism has still a lot to 
offer (cf. Smith 1999, Marín et al. 2000). This leads to the issue as to 
what is important is not consensus but rather a continual critical ap-
praisal of our theoretical formulations, which precisely shows the ten-
tative nature of science and hence science education (Abd-El-Khalick 
& Lederman 2000, McComas et al. 1998, Smith & Scharmann 1999; 
Niaz 2001b).  
 
 
2. Development of Science Education as Kuhnian Paradigms  
 
Although the role of controversy is recognized, Gil-Pérez et al. (2002) 
implicitly subscribe to a Kuhnian perspective of ‘normal’ science and 
hence the emphasis on ‘emergent consensus’ (p. 557, 558), ‘prepar-
adigmatic’ (p. 557), ‘paradigm change’ (p. 558). According to the au-
thors, in the early 1980s science education was still a ‘preparadig-
matic’ discipline. However, “. . . an impressive development throughout 
the last two decades, . . .” (p. 557) has facilitated an ‘emergent consen-
sus’, leading to a ‘paradigm change’ (it cannot be paradigm change, 
unless there is a prior paradigm). As we have shown in the ‘Introduc-
tion’, this conceptualization lacks the understanding that a ‘consensus’ 
Niaz  et  al .  in  Sc ience  &  Educat ion  12  (2003)       6
is at most a transitory feature of scientific progress both in science 
and education. Given the popularity in education of the Kuhnian thesis 
of paradigms being replaced (Lincoln 1989), it is not surprising that 
science educators also follow the same philosophical thesis. Interest-
ingly, however, the Kuhnian thesis has also been questioned by a lead-
ing educational theorist: “Where Kuhn erred, I believe, is in diagnos-
ing this characteristic [controversies/conflicts] of the social sciences 
as a developmental disability . . . it is far more likely that for the so-
cial sciences and education, the coexistence of competing schools of 
thought is a natural and quite mature state” (Shulman 1986, p. 5). In 
our opinion, research in science education in the last three decades 
has been a process of competing research programs (Ausubelian, Piag-
etian, Radical, Social and other constructivisms) based on critical ap-
praisals of the controversial nature of constructivism, that has facili-
tated ‘progressive transitions’ (Lakatos, 1970).  
Finally, in a strict Kuhnian sense (incommensurability thesis), sci-
ence education currently is not paradigmatic at all, because if it were, 
the underlying premises of the field would be impervious to the very 
debate we are all engaged in. Philosopher Gerald Holton (a close friend 
of the science education community) has provided insight as to how 
we may conceptualize continual critical appraisals: “. . . the scientists 
chief duty . . . [is] . . . not the production of a flawlessly carved block, 
one more in the construction of the final Temple of science. Rather, 
it is more like participating in a building project that has no central 
planning authority, where no proposal is guaranteed to last very long 
before being modified or overtaken, and where one’s best contribu-
tion may be one that furnishes a plausible base and useful material 
for the next stage of development” (Holton, 1986, p. 173).  
 
 
3. Influence of von Glasersfeld in Science Education  
 
Failure to recognize the importance of critical appraisals lead Gil- 
Pérez et al. to state: “We must insist on the negligible influence of 
von Glasersfeld in the development of the ‘constructivist consensus’ 
in science education” (p. 559). Furthermore, according to the authors, 
first references to von Glasersfeld in the science education literature 
started to appear in 1988 and in the next decade (1988–1998) the fol-
lowing journals had a total of only seven citations to his work (Journal 
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of Research in Science Teaching, JRST = 3, Science Education, SE = 2, 
International Journal of Science of Education, IJSE = 2, Studies in Sci-
ence Education, SSE = 0; 5 of these 7 citations were made by the same 
author, Ken Tobin). In order to pursue this aspect further we surveyed 
the above mentioned journals for the three year period (1999– 2001) 
and found the following citations to the work of von Glasersfeld: JRST 
= 18, SE = 6, IJSE = 14, and SSE = 4. This gives a total of 42 citations 
in three years – a six-fold increase with respect to the previous ten 
years, and of these only one citation was due to Ken Tobin. Interest-
ingly, von Glasersfeld (1989) received the most (9 out of 42) citations. 
We present these figures in order to follow the line of argument 
suggested by Gil-Pérez et al. On the contrary, in our opinion citation 
data alone do not tell the whole story and must be accompanied by 
qualitative indicators (Garfield & Welljams-Dorof 1992), such as von 
Glasersfeld’s participation in NARST conferences (see ‘Introduction’ 
section). We have shown that von Glasersfeld (without necessarily 
agreeing with him) wields considerable influence in science educa-
tion and was in part responsible for some of the ‘transitions’ (or tran-
sitory consensus, if you prefer).  
Once again, the Kuhnian perspective of the authors manifests itself 
in the following line of argument: As science education has attained 
the status of ‘a new field of research and knowledge’ (p. 557), accep-
tance of new ideas ‘reduces its theoretical bases to the [mere] appli-
cation of external knowledge’ (p. 560) and hence the ’contributions 
made by Kelly and . . . von Glasersfeld’ (p. 560) are questionable, as 
‘none of them work in science education’ (p. 560).We have shown that 
this perspective is not conducive towards a critical dialogue between 
the different competing research programs and especially in the case 
of von Glasersfeld the science education community does seem to ac-
cept it as useful to a certain degree. In conclusion, although von Gla-
sersfeld was not ‘the originator’ with respect to constructivism, he 
could perhaps be considered as ‘the synthesizer’.  
 
 
4. Constructivism in Science Education and Philosophical 
Constructivism  
 
Gil-Pérez et al. (2002) fail to recognize the importance of history and 
philosophy of science (HPS) for science education by asserting: “So, 
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we must stress that what we call constructivism in science educa-
tion has little to do with philosophical constructivism” (p. 559) and 
furthermore that, “. the debate put forward by Suchting and others 
(Nola 1997, Hardy & Taylor 1997) is not our debate” (p. 559, origi-
nal italics). Nola (1997) has argued how philosophical constructiv-
ism and constructivism in education are intertwined and the fail-
ure to recognize this precisely leads to, “. . . throwing out the dirty 
bath water of didacticism . . . [along with] . . . the baby of objective 
knowledge” (p. 80). Nola goes on to show how Plato and Socrates as 
early constructivists, differentiated between beliefs and knowledge 
(a distinction generally ignored by constructivists), and that teach-
ers transmit beliefs and not knowledge. No wonder, if this is ‘not our 
debate’, Nola (1997) was right in having foreseen: “It seems with re-
spect to epistemology that many of the recent moves in constructiv-
ist science education have been steps backwards, not forwards, from 
Socrates and Plato” (p. 81).  
There has been a plethora of arguments by science educators for in-
cluding history, philosophy of science and epistemology in the class-
room, primarily because recent developments in these fields merit 
their discussion and furthermore the responsibility for this task (dis-
cussion of HPS related issues, perhaps through some form of construc-
tivism) lies primarily with us (cf. Abd-El-Khalick et al. 1998, Burbules 
& Linn 1991, Duschl 1990, Gilbert & Swift 1985, Hodson 1988, Kelly 
1997, Koulaidis & Ogborn 1995, Marín et al. 1999, Matthews 1994, Mil-
lar & Driver 1987, Monk & Osborne 1997, Niaz 1993, Smith & Schar-
mann 1999, Tsai 2002, Tsaparlis 2001).  
Gil-Pérez et al. (2002) not only consider that this is ‘not our debate’ 
but also cite the following from Matthews (1997) to support their po-
sition: “It is clear that the best of constructivist pedagogy can be had 
without constructivist epistemology” (p. 561). In our opinion, these 
authors have misread Matthews’ position as after the cited part, Mat-
thews goes on to add: “. . . Socrates, Montaigne, Locke, Mill, and Rus-
sell are just some who have conjoined engaging, constructivist-like 
pedagogy with non-constructivist epistemology” (Matthews, 1997, 
p. 11). It is quite clear that Matthews is not endorsing ‘constructivist 
pedagogy without constructivist epistemology’, but rather alluding to 
the fact that much of constructivist pedagogy today amounts to ‘ped-
agogical commonplaces’ recommended by philosophers in the past. If 
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there were any doubt with respect to what Matthews is trying to do 
here and for the last many years, consider the following written in the 
previous paragraph: “It is now basically accepted that when science 
educators speak of epistemological matters they need to be, to some 
extent, familiar with the tradition of epistemological debate in philos-
ophy” (Matthews, 1997, p. 11). Similarly, Orlik (2002) has drawn at-
tention to the fact that some of the positive aspects of constructivist 
pedagogy have been practiced in the ex-Soviet Union for more than 
30 years (cf. Mahmutov, 1975).  
It is important to note that although Gil-Pérez et al., implicitly do 
subscribe to a Kuhnian perspective, there is no explicit elaboration 
of a philosophical framework. On the contrary, the authors’ advice to 
science teachers and science education researchers is not to engage “. 
. . in the nuances and subtleties of the epistemology of different au-
thors . . . [having] a common base. . . , such as Popper, Kuhn, Toul-
min, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Laudan, Giere . . . ” (pp. 562–563). Indeed, 
even a professional philosopher may find it difficult to elaborate a 
common base for such a wide range of authors. Ironically, the jour-
nal Science and Education (now running in its 12th year) was founded 
on the premise: “The communities of philosophers, historians, soci-
ologists, scientists, cognitive psychologists, and science educators are 
notoriously insular and seldom pay attention to issues outside their 
field. The educational loss is that all of the fields have contributions 
to make to the theoretical and practical problems facing science and 
mathematics teachers’ (Matthews, 1992, p. 2).  
 
 
5. Student as a Novice Researcher or a Developing Scientist  
 
Gil-Pérez et. al.’s presentation of the ‘student as a scientist’ metaphor 
(p. 560) leads to a ‘straw man’ as hardly any science educator would 
perhaps accept the thesis that students work/learn as scientists (on-
togenesis recapitulates phylogenesis). Science educators, psycholo-
gists and philosophers would perhaps agree that there is a limited re-
lationship between the process of theory development by scientists 
and a students’ acquisition of knowledge, i.e., a ‘developing scientist’ 
(Chinn & Brewer 1993, Duschl 1990, Kitchener 1987, Piaget & Garcia 
1989, Niaz 1995, von Glasersfeld 1989). Although the authors endorse 
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the role of students as novice researchers, it appears that under cer-
tain situations they do visualize the student as a scientist, an aspect 
that has been critiqued previously (Marín et al. 1999, Pozo & Gómez 
Crespo 1998) and the following corroborates our claim: “The proposal 
to organize pupils’ learning as a knowledge construction corresponds 
to the first situation [solving routine problems], that is to say, to an 
oriented research, in fields very well known by the ‘research director’ 
(the teacher) . . . ” (Gil-Pérez et al. 2002, p. 560).  
At this stage, it is interesting to note that the authors question the 
teaching strategy: “What is the sense of making pupils conscious of 
their ideas to immediately put them into conflict? In our opinion, 
the systematic confrontation of pupils’ ideas with scientific ones, can 
produce logical inhibitions [whatever that means]” (p. 565). Inter-
estingly, a knowledge of HPS would recommend such a strategy, ac-
companied by cognitive and other variables appropriate to students’ 
learning (cf. Laburú & Arruda 2002, Marín & Benarroch 1994, Marín 
et al. 1999, Pozo & Gómez Crespo 1998, Tsaparlis, 1997) as scientists 
often have to work with alternative/rival/conflicting ideas. Further-
more, consideration of alternative ideas does not automatically lead 
to changes in the conceptions of neither scientists nor students. Both 
scientists and students resist changes and more so if the ideas form 
part of their ‘hard core’ of thinking (Lakatos, 1970).  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
It is concluded that insistence on the lack of a relationship between 
constructivism in science education and philosophical constructivism 
is futile and may even lead us to ‘atheoretical’ forms of constructiv-
ism – a possibility that most science educators, including Gil-Pérez et 
al. 2002, definitely do not entertain.  
Finally, in our opinion continual critical appraisals of constructiv-
ism in science education can be compared to what the philosopher 
Hilary Putnam has referred to as the ‘boat metaphor’: ‘My image is 
not of a single boat but of a fleet of boats. The people in each boat are 
trying to reconstruct their own boat without modifying it so much 
at any one time that the boat sinks. . . . In addition, people are pass-
ing supplies and tools from one boat to another and shouting advice 
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and encouragement (or discouragement) to each other. Finally, people 
sometimes decide they do not like the boat they are in and move to a 
different boat altogether. And sometimes a boat sinks or is abandoned. 
It is all a bit chaotic; but since it is a fleet, no one is ever totally out 





Abd-El-Khalick, F., Bell, R.L. & Lederman, N.G.: 1998, ‘The Nature of Science and 
Instructional Practice: Making the Unnatural Natural’, Science Education 82, 
417–436.  
Abd.-El-Khalick, F. & Lederman, N.: 2000, ‘Improving Science Teachers’ 
Conceptions of Nature of Science: A Critical Review of the Literature’, 
International Journal of Science Education 22, 665–701.  
Burbules, N. & Linn, M.: 1991, ‘Science Education and Philosophy of Science: 
Congruence or Contradiction?’, International Journal of Science Education 13, 
227–241.  
Chinn, C.A. & Brewer, W.F.: 1993, ‘The Role of Anomalous Data in Knowledge 
Acquisition: A Theoretical Framework and Implications for Science Instruction’, 
Review of Educational Research 63, 1–49.  
Duschl, R.A.: 1990, Restructuring Science Education, Teachers College Press, New 
York.  
Erickson, F.: 1986, ‘Qualitative Methods in Research on Teaching’, in M.C. 
Wittrock (ed.), Handbook of Research on Teaching, 3rd edn, Macmillan, New 
York, pp. 119–161.  
Garfield, E. & Welljams-Dorof, A.: 1992, ‘Citation Data: Their Use as Qualitative 
Indicators for Science and Technology Evaluation and Policy-Making’, Current 
Contents 24, 5–13.  
Geelan, D.R.: 1997, ‘Epistemological Anarchy and the Many Forms of 
Constructivism’, Science & Education 6, 15–28.  
Gil-Pérez, D., Guisásola, J., Moreno, A., Cachapuz, A., Pessoa de Carvalho, A.M., 
Martínez Torregrosa, J., Salinas, J., Valdés, P., González, E., Gené Duch, A., 
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